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Intelligent machines do not really think
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(I. Rahwan).Analogies between Human and Machine Behavior
Machine behaviorists use the methods of the social and behavioral sciences to study intelligent
machines as if they were humans or other animals [1]. For example, if machine behaviorists
wished to understand the behavior of virtual assistants such as Siri or Alexa, they could run
controlled experiments to see how the assistants react to different requests in different contexts.
This approach does not assume that Siri and Alexa think the same way as human assistants, or
that it would be useful to understand human assistants in order to understand virtual assistants.
However, even though machine behaviorists would not draw such a naive analogy between
human intelligence and machine intelligence, it would also be a mistake to completely forget
that virtual assistants are inspired by human assistants.
First, if the analogy between human and virtual assistants guided the decisions of developers
(engineers, user experience designers, etc.), then it can be useful to understand how they, the
developers, conceive of human assistants to better understand the virtual assistants they
created. Second, if the analogy guides the behavior of users, then it can be useful to understand
how they, the users, conceive of human assistants, to better understand how these expectations
shape their interactions with virtual assistants –which can in turn shape the behavior of the virtual
assistants themselves. Thus, folk theories of how humans think can powerfully shape how
machines are developed and how these machines are ultimately perceived by users.
One folk theory in particular has permeated popular culture over the last decades: the idea that
humans ‘Think Fast and Slow’. Machines do not think fast and slow in the sense that humans
do – but the way humans think fast and slow can inspire the people who create intelligent
machines, just as they are inspired by other features of the humanmind and brain [2]. Furthermore,
and more importantly for this article, people have many expectations about the way others Think
Fast and Slow, and these expectations can shape their relations with intelligent machines as
soon as these machines somehow convey or pretend that they are thinking fast and slow as
humans do.
The Folk Theory of Thinking Fast and Slow
Our purpose does not require a state-of-the-art review of dual-process models, because we are
not concerned about the way humans ‘actually’ think fast and slow. What we are concerned with
is the folk theory of Fast and Slow Thinking (capitalized, see below) – or maybe the folk ‘theories’
of Fast and Slow Thinking: the theories that AI developers use as a rough analogy for the way theirTrends in Cognitive Sciences, December 2020, Vol. 24, No. 12 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2020.09.007 1019
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[3], Thinking, Fast and Slow [3,4], orGut Feelings: The Intelligence of the Unconscious [5]; or sim-
ply the theories that come from a lifelong experiencewith the way other people think and act. Here
we adopt the convention of using the terms Slow Thinking and Fast Thinking, capitalized, when
we refer to the folk version of the dual-process model. We do not capitalize ‘fast’ and ‘slow’
when we talk specifically about decision speed, or when we refer to the dual-process model itself
and not its folk version.
We do not know of any systematic work investigating the contents of the folk version of dual-
process theory. Note that the question here is not whether people have a ‘correct’ folk theory
of dual-process thinking. We have a reasonable consensus about how physics or biology
work, and thus it makes sense to ask how accurate is folk physics or folk biology – but we do
not have a similar consensus on dual-process thinking, and thus cannot really assess the accu-
racy of the folk dual-process theory. From a descriptive perspective, it seems a common enough
assumption that ‘Folk psychology [...] may be tracking, obscurely, the same fundamental duality
that scientific psychology has identified’ or that ‘The core of dual-process theory is present in the
everyday distinction between intuition and reason – the former immediate, quasi-perceptual,
sensitive to subconscious cues and sometimes biased; and the latter slow, effortful, explicit
and more cautious” [6]. What is missing though, as far as we know, is an examination of how
exactly the everyday distinction between intuition and reason maps onto the formal distinction
(s) that psychologists make between intuitive and reflective processes.What we do have, though,
is an empirical literature investigating how people respond to cues of intuition or reflection in
others, and how these cues inform their perception of others. This is the literature we build on
in the rest of this article. There is strong evidence that people use time, effort, and other
metacognitive cues linked to dual-process theory to make inferences about humans and
machines. In this opinion article, wemake the assumption that these inferences reflect a folk theory
of the Fast and Slow Thinking of machines and humans – but the contribution we make does not
entirely depend on this assumption. Indeed, the issues we review fall under the broader umbrella of
the metacognition of machines, that is, the way people project human cognition on machines.
While we defer to later sections the detailed examination of the metacognitive cues that people
attend to, and the effects these cues have on their perception of humans and machines, we
can briefly summarize here some of the key differences we will discuss between Fast and Slow
Thinking. First, Fast and Slow Thinking differ in speed and scope. Slow Thinking is, well, slow,
and can only process a small amount of information at a time – whereas Fast Thinking can pro-
cess large amounts of information without much effort. Second, Slow Thinking is based on ex-
plicit rules and transparent reasons – whereas Fast Thinking is implicit and based on opaque
heuristics. Third, Slow Thinking plays a corrective role when Fast Thinking is led astray, since
Fast Thinking is biased to rely too much on what is usual, normal, or familiar.
Our focus in this article is onmapping howpeople use the analogy of SlowThinking and Fast Thinking
on themachines they build and use.We distinguish between four groups of stakeholders: engineers,
end users, user experience designers, regulators, and ethicists.We argue that these groups focus on
different facets of the analogy, as we shall explore below (Figure 1).
Engineering: Do Fast and Slow Thinking Correspond to Different Programming
Techniques?
There is a long history of using the analogy of Fast and Slow Thinking in AI research. Even before
the rise of machine learning, AI scientists made a distinction between heuristic programming ap-
proaches [7] based on quick-fire rules [8], and symbolic approaches that are based on carefully1020 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, December 2020, Vol. 24, No. 12
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Figure 1. Examples of the Use of the ‘Fast and Slow’ Analogy by Stakeholders. The folk theory of mind that people
have about machines Thinking Fast or Slow impacts various stakeholders. These stakeholders might not use the analogy in
the same way, as symbolized by the different arrangements of F and S in the thought bubbles. On the development side,
engineers use the Fast and Slow analogy to select algorithmic solutions, while user experience (UX) designers use the
analogy to shape how the machine is perceived by the user. On the user side, regulators might encourage Slow Thinking
by machines for the purpose of producing explanations, while end user psychology ultimately determines how signals of
Fast and Slow Thinking (e.g., hesitation, self-correction, explanation giving) shape the trust placed into the machine. Yet
other examples are considered in the main text.
Trends in Cognitive Sciencescurated analytical rules [9] subject to formal logic-based reasoning [10,11]. This separation was
never clear-cut, though, since even logic-based reasoning often relies on heuristic pruning of
combinatorial search spaces, and is frequently applied over a combination of heuristic rules,
thus performing a kind of hybrid of Slow and Fast Thinking. Similarly, models that penalize com-
plexity, such as Lasso regression [12], can be seen as a form of Fast Thinking over simpler
models.
AI engineers can also use the nature of the task in order to distinguish heuristic and analytical rea-
soning. For example, one might consider automated theorem proving as an analytical task, while
considering short-term motion planning as a heuristic task, even if one uses heuristics to speed
up the former, and symbolic reasoning to conduct the latter.
Nowadays, when AI developers talk about machines Thinking Fast or Slow, they tend to agree
that machine learning – and in particular, deep learning [13] – corresponds to Fast Thinking
[14,15], based on analogies of speed and scope, rules and reasons, and bias and correction.
But often, this categorization fails to distinguish between the process of model learning itself –
for example, using back-propagation to train a convolutional neural network on millions of
image–caption pairs to learn a high-dimensional distribution of image features [16] – from the
application of the learned model – for example, feeding a new image to a pre-trained neural
network. The learning process may indeed be a very slow process, but it still seems to corre-
spond to Fast Thinking.Trends in Cognitive Sciences, December 2020, Vol. 24, No. 12 1021
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would only operate on a sparse network of knowledge [17,18]. Operating on such a sparse
network would also help the machine to express its conclusions in terms of explicit causal models
with rules and reasons, something that Fast Thinking can struggle with [19,20]. These causal
models would also help machines to overcome the problems that Fast Thinking has with
out-of-distribution generalizations, that is, correct inferences about situations which are far from
usual or familiar [18]. While many researchers agree that machine learning stands for Fast Thinking
in the dual-process analogy, there is no comparable agreement about what would stand for Slow
Thinking. Some researchers argue that a hybrid approach is required, in which Slow Thinking is
handled by a symbolic model, whereas others argue that Slow Thinking can be handled by an
appropriately modified machine learning approach [14,15,21,22].
User Experience
Do People Prefer Machines to Think Fast or Slow?
People do not trust machines equally for all tasks. For example, people trust machines to solve
complex numerical problems [23] more than they trust them to recognize good jokes [24], hire
good employees [25], or deal with emotions [26]. Generally speaking, it seems that people
make a distinction between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ tasks. They see objective tasks as requir-
ing rules and explicit reasoning; and subjective tasks as requiring intuitions, instinct, and implicit
processing. In other words, they see objective tasks as appropriate for Slow Thinking, and sub-
jective tasks as appropriate for Fast Thinking. And as it turns out, they spontaneously trust ma-
chines to perform objective tasks, but not subjective tasks [27]. That is, they trust machines to
Think Slow, but not to Think Fast (see Box 1 for a discussion of trust in machines beyond Fast
and Slow Thinking).
However, we may be at the exact point in time when this pattern will begin to change. It is indeed
possible that until recently, people were simply not accustomed yet to the idea of machines that
would Think Fast – that is, machines that would engage in the implicit, holistic processing of a
large amount of information, rather than on the sequential, explicit application of a set of rules.
What people were accustomed to instead was the idea of machines that would Think Slow,
apply logical rules or mathematical formulas in a rigid way, for predictable results. It is no longerBox 1. Trust in Machines
This opinion article focuses on how cues of Fast or Slow Thinking can influence people’s trust in intelligent machines, but
many other factors can affect this trust [48]. For example, people trust intelligent machines more when there is evidence
that they performwell on a given task, or when they are routinely used for this task [49]. Anthropomorphism [50] and social
behavior [51,52] can help a machine build trust, although these effects can be complex. For example, while machines can
learn behaviors that reliably elicit cooperation from humans [53], the mere fact that they are machines seems to penalize
the trust they inspire – even when keeping their behavior constant, machines that reveal their true nature elicit lower coop-
eration than machines who pretend to be human [47]. People trust machines less for decisions which have a moral com-
ponent [54], although this distrust may be attenuated if they share the ethical values embedded in the machine [55]. If the
ethical values embedded in machines are not aligned with the ethical values of users, there is a risk that users will simply
opt-out of using these machines, and forfeit the potential collective benefit of their use [56]. Cultural and individual differ-
ences can affect the values that people want to see embedded in machines, which makes it important to collect data in
large, multicultural samples in order to explore cultural and individual heterogeneity [35,57]. All the factors that affect trust
in machines may interact with the way machines display signals of Fast or Slow thinking. Whether the machine Thinks Fast
or Slow may affect expectations of performance on different tasks; anthropomorphism may amplify the effect of signals of
Fast or Slow Thinking; machines that learn to display signals of Fast or Slow Thinking may be better able to pass as
humans; Fast or Slow thinking may be perceived as more or less appropriate or desirable, depending on the moral com-
ponent involved in the decisions of the machine. Cultural norms may change the preferences of users for machines that
Think Fast or Think Slow, and individual differences may have a comparable impact. For example, people with a proclivity
to process information reflectively may find it easier to trust machines who Think Slow.
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black-box algorithms, or to emphasize the impenetrability of deep learning techniques.
Accordingly, people are getting more exposure to the idea that some machines may Think Fast.
And as it turns out, when people get exposed to the idea that machines may Think Fast, they
start trusting them with subjective tasks, instead of just trusting them for objective tasks [27].
Accordingly, we may be at a turning point regarding the tasks people are willing to leave to intel-
ligent machines. People used to have a restricted notion of what these machines were good for:
objective, Slow Thinking tasks. But they are now getting used to the idea that machines can think
in another way, a way for which they have the perfect analogy: Fast Thinking. People perceive a
difference between Fast and Slow Thinking, and they believe that these twomodes of thinking are
good for different tasks [28]. As a result, when they have to trust a machine, they may not simply
ask themselves ‘Does the task require Slow Thinking?”, but rather ‘Can the machine think in
whichever way is required by this task?’
Machines that look like they can think both ways, as humans do, would accordingly bemore likely
to be trusted, since they would seem to be flexible enough to handle both kinds of tasks. This
raises at least two questions, though. First, what do people infer about a machine that is showing
signs of Thinking Fast or Thinking Slow? And second, should we allow machines to pretend that
they are Thinking Fast or Slow, if this pretense could improve their interactions with humans?
What Do People Infer about Machines That Think Fast or Slow?
So far, we have suggested that people may react differently to machines they perceive as Thinking
Fast or Thinking Slow. If that is true, we need to consider the signals that people may attend to
when deciding whether a machine is Thinking Fast or Slow. AI user experience (UX) designers
may exploit these signals, in order to influence the way people interact with the AI. This is similar
to the way UX designers exploit psychological quirks in their design of social media sites, online
shopping sites, or smartphone applications [29].
When humans think, the main signals of Slow Thinking are time and effort. The longer it took to
reach a response, and the harder someone seemed to think, the more likely that person engaged
in Slow Thinking [30]. People make many inferences based on this perception. They believe that
Slow Thinkers are more likely to be correct, at least for difficult questions [28]. They believe that
Slow Thinkers have a more complicated moral character than Fast Thinkers – that is, they see
a strong link between the actions of Fast Thinkers and their moral character, but they are not
so sure about this link for Slow Thinkers [31]. People also brace themselves when someone en-
gages in Slow Thinking before talking, because they see this Slow Thinking as a harbinger of bad
news – which are more delicate to phrase than good news [32].
We should not automatically assume that people will make any of these inferences about ma-
chines that they perceive as Thinking Slow. For example, when it takes a human a long time to
generate a prediction, people trust that prediction more – but they trust the prediction ‘less’ if it
took a ‘machine’ a long time to generate it [33]. One possibility is that people judge humans
and machines using different benchmarks for decision time. Just as 15 years is a short life for a
human but a long life for a dog, 15 s of thinking may be short for a human, but long for a machine.
Accordingly, 15 s may be a signal of Fast Thinking for a human, but a signal of Slow Thinking for a
machine – and 15 min could be a signal of Slow Thinking for a human, but a signal of malfunction
for a machine. Thus, if we want to explore whether people react the same to humans who Think
Slow and machines who Think Slow, we will have to carefully calibrate what counts as a signal of
Slow Thinking for humans and for machines.Trends in Cognitive Sciences, December 2020, Vol. 24, No. 12 1023
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biases. This signal could play an important role in contexts where machines must make high-
stake decisions, for example in the moral domain. Machines can help make decisions with a
large impact on the life outcomes of humans – for example, when approving bank loans, deciding
whether a defendant will get parole, allocating kidneys, or make split-second choices when driv-
ing a car at full speed in a critical situation. In such situations, it is important to ensure that the de-
cisions or recommendations of the machine meet appropriate ethical standards. For that
purpose, the distribution of labor is usually that the machine Thinks Fast, and humans Think
Slow. Either humans try to consider ethical dilemmas before they occur, in order to ponder
them before the machine needs to solve them [34,35], or humans discover ethical issues with
the Fast Thinking of the machine, after the fact, and then apply Slow Thinking to correct these is-
sues [36,37]. But what if machines could use some form of Slow Thinking about their own Fast
Thinking, in order to diagnose ethical issues with their own behavior, and self-correct to eliminate
these issues? How exactly this could be implemented is a matter of debate [15,22], but our focus
here is on how it would change the way people perceive intelligent machines that make high-
stake decisions.
First, we would need to investigate whether people think that self-diagnosing and self-correcting
ethical lapses is a job for Slow Thinking— and if they think this is equally true for humans and for
machines. Second, we would have to investigate the inferences people would make about a ma-
chine that displays the ability to self-diagnose and self-correct in the moral domain. Consider a
machine meant to help a judge to decide which defendant gets parole. Imagine now that after
a few months of use, the machine tells the judge that it has diagnosed a racial bias in the recom-
mendations it hasmade so far, and that it will now try to bemore lenient to black defendants. How
would the judge react?Would she bemore likely or less likely to trust the recommendations of the
machine from that point on? It is not at all clear that the admission of past mistakes might increase
trust in the machine – insofar as we know that people lose trust in machines that make mistakes
faster than they lose trust in humanswhomakemistakes [38,39]. While this aversion can be over-
come if people can tweak the machine themselves [40], we do not know if it can be overcome by
a promise by the machine to fix itself.
Law and Ethics: Should We Allow Machines to Pretend They Think Fast and
Slow?
We have argued that the trust that people have in machines which perform as advisors or social
partners may depend on the kind of Thinking that machines signal to humans. Machines do not
really think fast or slow, however, not as humans do. In a sense, people are being deceived, at
least by omission, when they react positively to a machine because they have projected on this
machine the kind of thinking that humans do.
This means that we have to be careful about where to draw the line when we allow machines to
send signals of Fast or Slow Thinking in their interactions with humans. Consider for example the
problem of explanation. Many argue that machines would be trusted more if they could articulate
a rationale for their predictions or recommendations – instead of, for example, simply stating
these predictions or recommendations based on an opaque neural network computation [19].
Providing an explicit reasoning for a conclusion (instead of framing it as an intuition) is a charac-
teristic of Slow Thinking. In other words, the machine is displaying signals of Slow Thinking in
order to be trusted more. Maybe that alone would not count as deception, if the machine pro-
vides an explanation that is a genuine and straightforward reflection of the reasons underlying
its recommendations. It is perhaps unavoidable that in so doing, it will appear to Think Slow to
human eyes – and if this appearance of Slow Thinking makes the machine more convincing,1024 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, December 2020, Vol. 24, No. 12
Outstanding Questions
Do people see black-box algorithms
as the machine equivalent to the Fast
Thinking of humans?
Do people think that machines that
Think Fast are good at the things
human Fast Thinking is good for?
What do people think it means for a
machine to think long and hard?
What kind of signals can a machine
use to convey that it is Thinking Slow?
Do machines win or lose credibility if
they self-diagnose and admit to their
own biases? Is it credible for a machine
to state that it is going to correct its
own biases?
Is it acceptable for a machine to let
people believe it is Thinking Fast or
Slow, when there is at best a loose
analogy between what humans do
and what it is doing?
Should machines be allowed to give
an inaccurate explanation of their
recommendations, when humans would
be biased against the most accurate
explanation? How would people
react to machines that would admit
to occasionally engage in such
rationalization?
Trends in Cognitive Sciencesmaybe this is just a positive but not explicitly pursued side effect of making the machine more
transparent [41].
This is only possible, though, for machines that process information in a way that naturally lends
itself to simple explanations – and this is itself an increasingly unlikely occurrence. In most cases,
the explanation is only an approximate mapping of what actually went on under the hood. In a
sense, the explanation is akin to a data visualization or an infographic. The data visualization
aims at helping viewers to understand the gist of the results, but it does not aim at explaining
the intricacies of the statistical modelling that allowed the results to be established. It is
constrained by the data, but it is also a persuasion tool: among the dozens possible ways of vi-
sualizing the data, one was singled out, the one that seemed the most convincing. The same
goes on when a machine produces an explanation of its deep computations. The explanation
is the result of a complex trade-off between fidelity, simplicity, and persuasiveness [19]. Consider,
for example, a case where two explanations could be produced. The two explanations have the
same fidelity to the actual computations of the machine. However, one of themwill not be as con-
vincing to humans, because of a known cognitive bias. In this case, it would seem best for the
machine to show users the most convincing of the two explanations [42,43]. After all, why be
self-defeating and show humans an explanation that they are irrationally biased against? This is
a path, however, that can easily lead to deception. Imagine again that two explanations could
be produced. One explanation is slightly more faithful to the Fast Thinking of the machine, but it
is also vastly less convincing, still because of a cognitive bias. Should it be eliminated in favor of
the explanation that is slightly less faithful but vastly more convincing?
Doing so would be deceptive if users had reasons to expect maximally faithful explanations. It
would be less deceptive if users were warned that the machine may at times try to ‘rationalize’
its recommendations, rather than explain them. It would be fascinating to see how much such
an admission would change the trust that people have in machines. This change could be
small, for psychological and practical reasons. From a psychological perspective, rationalization
is a common use of slow thinking in humans [44,45], and it is accordingly possible that people
would expect and tolerate some level of rationalization from machines, too, as soon as the ma-
chines pretend to Think Fast and Slow. From a practical perspective, we know that people are
sometimes willing to be nudged toward a decision that serves their goals, even when the
nudge can be construed as manipulative [46]. Accordingly, it is possible that they may allow ma-
chines to be slightly manipulative, if such machine behavior is proven beneficial [47].
Concluding Remarks
Intelligent machines have become so prevalent, so complex, and so intricately embedded with
humans and other machines, that it is no longer possible to predict what they will do based on
how they were designed. As a result, scientists have started to use the methods of behavioral
science to study intelligent machines from the outside, as if they were humans or other animals.
Citizens are engaging in their own version of this paradigm shift. Faced with machines whose
capabilities and inclinations have become mysterious, people are recruiting the mental tools
they use to assess other humans, and repurposing them for the assessment of machines.
In this opinion article, we speculated in particular about the way people relate to machines that
display signs of Fast and Slow thinking.
As soon as machines display signs of Thinking Fast or Thinking Slow, people will make inferences
about what they can trust the machines with, just as they make these inferences about humans.
Accordingly (see Outstanding Questions for specific examples), we need to understand the sig-
nals of Fast or Slow Thinking that people pick up when they deal with machines; we need toTrends in Cognitive Sciences, December 2020, Vol. 24, No. 12 1025
Trends in Cognitive Sciencescompare the inferences theymade aboutmachines that Think Fast or Slow, to the inferences they
make about humans; and we need to tackle the difficult ethical concerns that come with the
potential for manipulation intrinsic to machines that learn to pretend they are Thinking Fast or
Thinking Slow.
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